

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SP-03 DRC-01 RSC-01 /031 W

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R 141147Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9927

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 14456

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR

SUBJECT: SUMMARY TELEGRAM OF PART I OF EUROPARA

1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES A SUMMARY INTRODUCTION  
TO EMBASSY PARIS' CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPARA FRANCE 1974.  
OUR EUROPARA CONTRIBUTION WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.  
THE CABLE DISCUSSES THE CURRENT SETTING IN FRANCE, SOME

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OBSERVATIONS ON FUTURE TRENDS AND A STATEMENT OF THE

EMBASSY'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE OVERALL POLICY GUIDELINES ON WHICH OUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE PARA ARE BASED. END SUMMARY.

1. SINCE HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF FRANCE ON MAY 19, GISCARD HAS MOVED QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO PUT HIS PERSONAL STAMP ON THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS LEFT NO DOUBT ABOUT HIS INTENTION TO EXERCISE FULLY THE EXTENSIVE POWERS INVESTED IN THE PRESIDENCY BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHERE HE HAS NAMED "TECHNICIANS" AS MINISTER, HE CLEARLY MEANS TO SET AND GUIDE POLICIES FROM THE ELYSEE.

2. DURING HIS FIRST MONTH IN POWER, GISCARD HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RELEGATE TO THE PAST THE ACRIMONY AND IRRITATION WHICH CHARACTERIZED US-FRENCH RELATIONS DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF POMPIDOU'S LIFE. HE HAS A BETTER FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S. THAN POMPIDOU HAD, UNDERSTANDS OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, AND HAS HAD LONG, AND FOR THE MOST PART FRUITFUL, EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES. WHILE HE IS COMMITTED TO THE MAJOR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY LINES FOLLOWED BY POMPIDOU, E.G. NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, THE FORCE DE FRAPPE, AN INFLUENTIAL INTERNATIONAL ROLE FOR FRANCE, HE BRINGS TO HIS ADMINISTRATION LESS IDEOLOGICAL BAGGAGE AND IS MORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS THE U.S. THAN EITHER OF HIS FIFTH REPUBLIC PREDECESSORS. MOREOVER, HE HAS INHERITED A GRAVE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH CAN ONLY BE RELIEVED THROUGH COOPERATION WITH -- NOT OPPOSITION TO -- THE U.S. THESE FACTORS, PLUS HIS PRAGMATISM AND THE BUSINESSLIKE STYLE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, FORESHADOW A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE TONE AND PERHAPS THE SUBSTANCE OF FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. FRANCE WILL ALSO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN FORGING BETTER US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SIMPLY BY ABANDONING THE ABRASIVE ASPECTS OF GOF FOREIGN POLICY IN PAST MONTHS.

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3. TWO MAJOR CONSTRAINTS, HOWEVER, COULD LIMIT GISCARD'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO MOVE FRANCE IN THESE DIRECTIONS. THE FIRST IS THE EXTREME NARROWNESS OF HIS VICTORY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE SUBJECTED TO STRONG AND CONTINUOUS PRESSURE FROM THE UNION OF THE LEFT, WHICH EMERGED FROM ITS EXCELLENT SHOWING IN THE MAY 19 ELECTIONS (49.3 OF THE VOTE) DETERMINED TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION ROLE AND TO PREPARE FOR

ITS NEXT TRY FOR POWER IN THE L978 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION.  
ALTHOUGH THE LEFT IS DIVIDED TO SOME DEGREE ON FOREIGN  
POLICY ISSUES, BOTH COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS CAN BE  
EXPECTED TO CRITICIZE ANY FRENCH SHIFT TOWARDS A MORE  
"ATLANTIC" FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION. LEFT OPPOSITION,  
TOGETHER WITH THE INFLUENCE OF THE GAULLIST GROUP  
IN THE ASSEMBLY -- 181 DEPUTIES OUT OF 490 -- LEAVE  
GISCARD A NARROW MARGIN FOR FOREIGN POLICY MANEUVER,  
AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET OF HIS TENURE IN OFFICE.

4. A SECOND CONSTRAINT IS THE POTENTIAL  
FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN FRANCE.

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R 141147Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9928

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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WHILE FRANCE HAS MADE SOLID ECONOMIC ADVANCES DURING THE PAST DECADE AND STILL ENJOYS A BASICALLY SOUND ECONOMY, AFFLUENCE HAS NOT RESOLVED THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS BORN OF INFLATION AND AN INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRUITS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE THIN EDGE OF GISCARD'S VICTORY AND THE STRENGTH SHOWN BY THE LEFT, DEMONSTRATE THAT FRANCE IS NOT IMMUNE TO THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURES REFLECTED IN VARYING DEGREES IN THE REST OF EUROPE. IF GISCARD IS UNABLE TO DAMPEN INFLATIONARY PRESSURES, IF HE IS SECRET

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UNABLE TO MAKE GOOD HIS CAMPAIGN PLEDGES ON SOCIAL CHANGE AND PROGRESS, FRANCE COULD BE PLAGUED DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS BY INTERNAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD SEVERELY LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO PLAY A MEANINGFUL, POSITIVE ROLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE.

5. THE FRAGILITY OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN FRANCE IS SYMPTOMATIC OF A SITUATION PREVALENT THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE. ALONGSIDE THE RECENT STREAM OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ERODED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE SPIRALLING COST OF RAW MATERIALS, RUN OLDER AND DEEPER CURRENTS OF DIVISION WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED. THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE -- IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, ENGLAND, GERMANY, ITALY, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE -- ECONOMIC CRISIS, POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND IDEOLOGICAL TENSIONS ARE THE ORDER OF THE DAY. IN THIS SITUATION, WE BELIEVE U.S. POLICIES, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE PURSUED, COULD HAVE A MAJOR, PERHAPS DETERMINING INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE.

6. THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAVE STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT THE CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS PARTNERSHIP WITH A STRONG, UNITED EUROPE. WE INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT IN THE BROAD ORDER OF PRIORITIES OF THE U.S. THE SOLIDARITY OF THE WEST RANKS FOREMOST. IDEALLY, ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. POLICIES AND INTERESTS IN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD SHOULD NOT CONFLICT OR BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. BUT, ACCORDING TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. GOALS, WHEN THERE ARE CONFLICTS OF PRIORITY, THE TOUCHSTONE OF OVERALL U.S. POLICY IS THE CONTINUED STRENGTH AND DURABILITY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

7. IN ACCORD WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. PRIORITIES,  
EMBASSY PARIS HAS, OVER THE PAST MONTHS, MADE SEVERAL  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, I.E. ON THE U.S. ATTITUDE  
TOWARDS EUROPEAN DEFENSE (PARIS 32491; 1973), ON  
EUROPEAN UNITY (PARIS 11128; MAY 1974), ON US-  
EUROPEAN CONSULTATIONS (PARIS 12008; MAY 1974), ON  
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CSCE (PARIS 13555; JUNE 1974). WE HAVE RECOMMENDED  
THAT THE U.S. MAKE AN EXTRA EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE  
EUROPEAN INTERESTS WHILE STRENGTHENING THE TIES OF  
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, NOT BECAUSE WE HAVE WISHED TO  
SPEAK AS A "FRIEND IN COURT" FOR THE FRENCH OR THE  
EUROPEANS, BUT BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN  
APPROACH FURTHERS THE LONG-RANGE INTERESTS OF THE  
U.S. STATED SIMPLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SLOW, UN-  
SETTLING, AT TIMES PAINFUL EUROPEAN EVOLUTION TOWARDS  
UNION AND IDENTITY SHOULD BE NURTURED, FOR TWO

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ACTION EUR-25

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9929

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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REASONS: (A) BECAUSE ONLY A UNITED, SELF-CONFIDENT EUROPE WILL HAVE THE STRENGTH TO SHARE IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEETING THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL (PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR), CHALLENGES TO THE WEST; AND (B) BECAUSE THE ALTERNATIVE TO EUROPEAN UNITY, A WEAK AND DEPENDENT GROUPING OF STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE, REPRESENTS AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK.

8. IN THE COMING YEAR, IN OUR VIEW, THE FULL BURDEN

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OF LEADERSHIP WILL FALL SQUARELY ON THE U.S. ESPECIALLY, GIVEN THE SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE U.S. WILL NEED TO TAILOR ITS POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNITY AND WILL NEED AN EXTRA MEASURE OF PATIENCE AND FOREBEARANCE IN NEGOTIATING A RELATIONSHIP FOR THE FUTURE WITHIN NATO AND WITH THE COMMON MARKET. IN OUR VIEW WE SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL IN ADOPTING A STYLE AND PROCEDURE WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN SENSITIVITIES AND INTEREST IN DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN IDENTITY, SEPARATE FROM BUT IN NO WAY HOSTILE TOWARDS THE U.S. WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT SACRIFICING ANY SPECIFIC U.S. POLITICAL OR DEFENSE INTERESTS OR INTERESTS IN THE TRADE AND MONETARY FIELDS. ON THE CONTRARY, IF WE ADOPT AND MAINTAIN SUCH GENERAL POLICY GUIDELINES TOWARDS EUROPE AND FRANCE WE BELIEVE THE U.S. WILL FIND IN THE NEW FRENCH LEADERSHIP A VALUABLE ALLY IN ESTABLISHING A SOLID, MUTUALLY FRUITFUL US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE PARA ARE BASED ON THESE PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IMPERATIVES, AS SEEN FROM EMBASSY PARIS.  
IRWIN

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Subject:** SUMMARY TELEGRAM OF PART I OF EUROPARA  
**TAGS:** PFOR, ECON, EFIN, FR, US, (GISCARD D'ESTAING, VALERY)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005